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Chairman: Alhaji SULE KOLO (Nigeria)

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PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A. da COSTA GUIMARAES

Mr. L.F.P. LAMPREIA

Bulgaria:

Mr. K. CHRISTOV

Mr. B. KONSTANTINOV

Burma:

U KYAW MIN

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS

Mr. A.G. CAMPBELL

Mr. J.R. MORDEN

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. T. LAHODA

Mr. R. KLEIN

Mr. J. STRUCKA

Ethiopia:

Mr. A. ZELLEKE

India:

Mr. M.A. HUSAIN

Mr. K.P. JAIN

Italy:

Mr. R. CARACCIOLO

Mr. G.P. TOZZOLI

Mr. R. BERLENGHI

Mexico:

Mr. J. CASTANEDA

Mr. H. CARDENAS RODRIGUEZ

Nigeria:

Alhaji SULE KOLO

Mr. B.O. TONWE

Poland:

Mr. H. JAROSZEK

Mr. H. STEPOSZ

Mr. S. DABROWA

Romania:

Mr. N. ECOBESCO
Mr. O. IONESCO
Mr. V. TARZIORU
Mr. C. GEORGESCO

Sweden:

Mrs. A. MYRDAL
Mr. A. EDELSTAM
Mr. H. BLIX
Mr. R. BOMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN
Mr. R.M. TIMERBAEV
Mr. V.V. SHUSTOV
Mr. M.P. SHELEPIN

United Arab Republic:

Mr. O. SIRRY
Mr. M. SHAKER

United Kingdom:

Mr. I.F. PORTER
Mr. W.N. HILLIER-FRY
Mr. R.I.T. CROMARTIE

United States of America:

Mr. G. BUNN
Mr. C. GLEYSTEN
Mr. S. GRAYBEAL
Mr. C.G. BREAN

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

1. The CHAIRMAN (Nigeria): I declare open the 385th plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.
2. Mrs. MYRDAL (Sweden): As the time available to the Committee for this session is brief, I feel that the earliest opportunity must be used for starting a substantive discussion on further disarmament measures. I also have in mind the encouraging example of the representative of the United Kingdom, Mr. Mulley, who already filled his first statement in the Committee at this session (ENDC/PV.381) with an amplitude of concrete suggestions.
3. Therefore this morning I am asking that the Committee's attention be turned to a specific and urgent subject: a comprehensive ban on nuclear-weapon tests. Not only the repeated demands by the United Nations General Assembly for action in this field but also some new and encouraging events justify renewed preoccupation with this matter. I do not dare to be so optimistic as to expect a fully-fledged treaty banning underground tests to be concluded at this very session; but we ought to be able to report to the General Assembly in due time that considerable progress is being made. Such news about our work would stimulate further the disarmament debate in general. And a more active debate of this kind might well turn up suggestions of practical importance for our continued work on a treaty banning all tests. It might also be in the interest of the technical groups concerned with testing to get a signal for the planning of the organization of a changeover in the foreseeable future.
4. As to the encouraging new events which might smooth the way for our work, I have in mind in particular two developments, one political and one more technical in nature.
5. The political -- and the more important -- one, of course, refers to the pledges made by the United States and the Soviet Union to undertake bilateral negotiations on restricting strategic nuclear weapon systems, offensive and defensive (*ibid.*, para.34). If, as we all hope, the main Powers come to an agreement to halt the further development of these already very advanced weapon systems, the main reason for conducting nuclear tests in those countries should disappear. Thus, fortunately, the defence security arguments for a test ban are becoming stronger, since the parties to an agreement limiting the development of strategic systems will want reassurance as to the mutual respect for such an agreement. A comprehensive test ban may thus become an almost necessary ingredient of an over-all agreement on the non-development of strategic weapon systems.

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6. The second auspicious event is the continued progress made in regard to methods of control of an underground test ban. I am thinking specifically of verification by seismic methods. We have noted with deep satisfaction and as a good omen that for the first time in many years scientists from different sides came together recently at an unofficial scientific meeting to discuss the technical aspects of the control of an underground test ban. I am referring to the meetings which took place recently in Sweden under the auspices of the International Institute for Peace and Conflict Research in Stockholm (SIPRI), at which experts from Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, India, Japan, Romania, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States and the USSR were present. A unanimously-adopted summary of their full report has been made available to delegations in document ENDC/230.

7. I think it should be noted that, although the Swedish delegation has served as an intermediary, the document is the responsibility, of course, of that international and independent Institute. The full report of the meetings, containing also the explicit views on points on which the experts differed, will be made available as a publication by the Research Institute in the near future. As I have just mentioned, the summary report contains the points on which the experts were agreed. In view of the fact that a similar confrontation of views between experts has not taken place since 1960, the results of those meetings -- though unofficial in character -- deserve close study. I therefore wish to make the following remarks on the background and the contents of that summary report.

8. The discussion by the experts was limited to the basic methods for the control of an underground test ban by national means only, and did not deal much with the practical applicability of the basic methods which are available at present. It was recognized by all participants that one seismological identification method developed in the United Kingdom, using the relative strength of long- and short-period earth movements, gives a sufficiently certain positive identification of underground explosions, provided the explosions are strong enough. Those findings in the United Kingdom were supported by similar evidence from Canada, the Soviet Union and the United States. It was also found that existing ordinary seismological networks could be used to apply that method in regard to explosions in hard rock when the yields were from 20 to 60 kilotons. Concerning smaller explosions the experts did not reach a consensus.

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9. It should be noted that the report was produced within a limited framework. The experts did not at that time explore in detail the possibilities of using the big, modern array stations equipped with the very sensitive long-period seismographs required for applying to weaker underground events the British identification method I have just mentioned.

10. It also became clear at the meetings that the different characteristics of the instruments employed in the Soviet Union on the one hand and in most other countries on the other hand necessitate further studies, both experimental and theoretical. The great value of personal contacts in this rather special field is well illustrated by the fact that some comparative calculations were immediately undertaken by some of the participants, who were then able to explain to their colleagues who were present some of the essential elements of differences in evaluation caused by the fact that experts used differing systems. I mention that detail only to stress the important practical value of meetings of experts towards a further understanding of the complicated control issue.

11. I should now like to turn to some specific conclusions that we in our delegation have drawn from the summary report of the experts. I would first mention the encouragement we feel in seeing mentioned as one of the possibilities for further improvement of identification the employment of statistical methods as we proposed here at last year's session of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC/191). We have now a renewed confidence in our belief that these methods could be a very efficient tool for bridging the remaining magnitude gap between strong underground events that can be identified with certainty today by using seismological means alone, and weaker events which would have to be covered in order to underpin an underground test ban with a completely meaningful control system. I do not wish to take the Committee's time by repeating here and now what my delegation said last year when we tried to elaborate in the Committee on this method; but I beg to refer my colleagues to the relevant verbatim records, documents ENDC/PV.309, 315 and 323.

12. In this connexion it should be noted that the experts in their summary report make clear that explosions weaker than 20 kilotons and completely contained in very loose soil or in large cavities in hard rock seem to escape all present means of detection and identification from a distance.

13. The countries which have repeatedly insisted on the importance of an effective international data exchange system as a vital part of the control arrangements for an

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underground test-ban agreement should be gratified by the unanimous support of the experts for such an exchange. In our delegation we have noted this part of the report as an encouragement for continued efforts to establish that co-operative system of data exchange.

14. My own conclusion, after having studied carefully the report by the experts, is that the state of the art of identification by seismological methods has progressed further and that we should be particularly encouraged by the fact that experts from various important countries have for the first time agreed that a broad field of seismic events do allow positive identification as to their origin: are they natural earthquakes or man-made explosions? This progress seems to be so important that it must have an influence on political positions. The negotiating positions maintained since 1963 simply cannot remain fixed and frozen.

15. To be effective, our work in relation to underground test-ban control must be carried forward in converging directions. The effort of the scientists to provide efficient control methods must now be matched by a corresponding effort to set a defined political goal for the control endeavours. This would in practical terms mean political decisions on what risk, at different explosion-yield levels, of unrevealed cheating is tolerable. If we make such decisions it will give the scientists working in this field the necessary guidance to know when their efforts to extend identification possibilities have reached the stage where their findings can be put to definitive practical use. But what is much more important is that we are all eager to see a convergence of the political desiderata with the technical capabilities, in order to narrow the field of dispute and reach a viable agreement.

16. The United Kingdom delegation has opened this debate by making some new and concrete suggestions. I should like to turn for a moment to Mr. Mulley's ideas and offer some preliminary comments. We first observe his suggestion --

"... that consideration be given to the possibility of the treaty's providing for a special committee whose function it would be to consider complaints of infringements of the treaty and assess the evidence produced in support of the complaint". (ENDC/PV.381, para.76)

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17. As we have in this Committee had some earlier experience with similar suggestions -- I am thinking of the proposal by the eight non-aligned members of the Committee for an international commission (ENDC/28) -- we shall, of course, be particularly interested to learn in due time about the acceptability of this idea at the present time to the other nuclear-weapon Powers members of this Committee. Until we know more about the attitude of others, the Swedish delegation would not wish to bind itself to any definite position on this point, the more so as Mr. Mulley's proposal of a committee seems to presuppose that obligatory inspection in loco is a necessary element of a comprehensive test-ban control system. As we have stated in the past, my delegation is not ready to commit itself to that assumption. Our efforts in the control field have, on the contrary, been inspired by a desire to reduce the requirements for inspections and to find ways of securing sufficient verification by other methods, offering greater hopes of general acceptability and being, at the same time, less burdensome for all the parties which may wish to make a contribution to the verification of a treaty. The seismological methods have the additional advantage of offering a "spin-off" leading to improved possibilities of earthquake prediction.

18. I shall turn now to Mr. Mulley's other suggestion, concerning a system of quotas for tests on a descending scale over a limited period of years, ending with a nil quota after which further tests would be banned absolutely (ibid., para.77). This is an interesting addendum to the list of earlier proposals for some modus vivendi arrangement, including various proposals on some kind of moratorium. There may come quite an avalanche of comments and views, critical and otherwise, on this point; but let me at this early stage in the debate try to pose a couple of positive ideas, or at least positive queries, to Mr. Mulley and other interested parties.

19. The first is, would a phasing-out period facilitate agreements on control by allowing experimentation with verification methods? More particularly, would the method of verification by challenge -- which is in reality the method in operation as far as the Moscow Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1) is concerned -- be tested on some suspicious event occurring outside the announced series in the legalized category? That would seem to be in line with a similar suggestion made first in another international forum and then introduced in this Committee by Lord Chalfont (ENDC/PV.279, pp. 13-15).

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20. A second, and perhaps in reality rather opportune, possibility is that the proposed legalized quota of underground explosions might be set aside to serve the further development of explosive devices for peaceful purposes. Of course, all types of peaceful explosions should in any case be inside the quota. This idea might be made a constituent element in the agreement on an international régime for peaceful nuclear explosions. It would seem to be appropriate that the stage of "free" experimentation would end with our arrival at a final test ban, as thereafter explosions for development purposes would come under the same rules as those for active utilization of the devices. I must remark that otherwise the prospects of continued development work on the peaceful nuclear devices mentioned by the representative of the United States, Mr. Foster, at our last meeting -- specifically in so far as it calls for test explosions -- could hardly be made compatible with a ban on nuclear-weapon testing. We have to recall that, as has been said so often, a nuclear device is a nuclear device and is inseparable from a nuclear weapon. Just as inseparable, and certainly as unscrutinizable, is, of course, development work on them. I believe there is a consensus on this point.

21. Despite the weight of these more technical arguments, the chief issue in regard to Mr. Mulley's proposal is, of course: would this proposal for a step-wise cessation of underground tests lead to a progressive build-up of mutual confidence?

22. In order to carry us further forward, I also feel obliged to proffer a comment on some remarks made by the representative of Czechoslovakia, Mr. Lahoda, at our meeting of 23 July (ENDC/PV.383, para.49). He reminded us of an idea, originally put forward in our Committee by the delegation of the United Arab Republic (ENDC/PV.224, page 9), that underground tests might be stopped even if no agreement could be reached on a complete ban. This would be achieved by temporarily combining a definite prohibition of underground explosions above a certain threshold, expressed in seismic magnitude, with a moratorium on explosions below that level. When this proposal has figured in disarmament debates it has been connected with an apparent expectation that the given threshold could be successively lowered with the advance in identification reliability.

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23. I am afraid, however, that the idea behind this suggestion does not seem to be a very hopeful one, on account of the technicalities involved. It is not possible to obtain an unequivocal interpretation of seismic records so as to determine the yield of an explosion. One reason -- as indicated in the summary report of the recent meeting of seismological experts -- is that the conditions of the ground in which an explosion takes place can affect the observed magnitude by more than one unit on the seismic scale. The conclusion is unavoidable, although regrettable, that it is not feasible to control a ban on test explosions above a prescribed threshold through verification by seismological methods.

24. Turning now from considerations of some special suggestions, I want to bring back to our attention a proposal, made by my delegation earlier, that the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament should at last sit down to the straightforward work on a draft treaty text to ban the whole range of underground testing. We all know that only a text will call forth a fully considered, responsible and concrete formulation of positions. With the texts of the Moscow Treaty and the non-proliferation treaty (ENDC/226^{*}) before us, the drafting would not seem to be overwhelmingly difficult.

25. The preambular paragraphs could to a large extent be repeated or condensed from those treaty texts, to which a treaty banning nuclear-weapon tests underground would be a supplement. A first operative article would obviously have to contain the obligation by the parties to prohibit, to prevent and not to carry out any underground nuclear-weapon test explosions, or, subject to an exception which has to be made, underground explosions of any other nuclear explosive devices. This would be fully in conformity with the earlier treaties, as would a second paragraph to refrain from encouraging such activities in other countries. An explicit exception to the main article would have to state that the provisions did not apply to explosions which were carried out for construction or other peaceful purposes and which took place under an international régime and in conformity with a separately-negotiated international agreement.

26. In passing, I might mention that such a separate agreement on peaceful nuclear explosions, to which several delegations have devoted attention here in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and in the United Nations debate, would have to contain the rules about nuclear devices used for such purposes. These will have to

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remain within the possession and custody of nuclear-weapon countries; but their use should be pursuant to permission in each specific case by an international agency. As a concomitant to the prohibitory treaties -- that is, the non-proliferation and the underground test-ban treaties -- the benefits of exceptions would be granted to the signatories of one or both of these treaties.

27. In a second operative article in an underground test-ban treaty, obligations as to co-operation between parties should be spelt out according to lines which this Committee has by and large agreed to earlier: to co-operate in good faith to ensure the full observance of the treaty, to co-operate in an international exchange of seismological data, and to co-operate for the clarification of events which occur and which may be pertinent to the subject matter.

28. This might then lead to a third operative article, if it seemed necessary to deal more fully with the procedure for verification. There, in the first instance, would be set out the preliminary steps which would have to be taken and which do form part of a "verification-by-challenge" process: any party being entitled to make inquiries and receive information, any party being entitled to make proposals as to suitable methods of further clarification, and, finally, any State being entitled to invite inspection, such inspection to be carried out in the manner prescribed by the inviting State. This last provision may be unnecessary in a treaty, as all States do have this freedom of action as a self-evident right; but the pinpointing of the manner in which inspections should be undertaken may make inclusion of the provision worth while.

29. There would then remain the additional problem as to whether obligatory inspections should be prescribed. There we meet not only political but also several practical problems which are as yet unresolved -- for example, the moot question whether the quota of inspections should apply to all signatories.

30. We must also visualize more clearly how the process should conclude if manifested suspicions that the treaty has been violated have not been satisfactorily cleared up. I do not intend today to probe deeper into the subject matter of these problems, which are the only ones which seem to us really to be still debatable.

31. The main regulatory articles I have just discussed seem to flow out of our previous work, and following articles on signature, ratification, withdrawal, etc. can easily be made to parallel those in the instruments of new international law which we have already succeeded in establishing.

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32. In view of the pressing need that the Eighteen-Nation Committee come to grips with further measures of disarmament, I have not hesitated today to touch upon a rather long list of the substantive issues we have to deal with as regards making the test ban comprehensive. The reasons for our persistent urging that this should be the next disarmament measure to be elaborated in the Committee are so compelling -- indeed more compelling today than at any previous time. I should like to try to divide these reasons into three main categories.

33. One is the reason devolving from the transactional situation in our negotiations: the test-ban issue must be clarified as a link between the recently-concluded non-proliferation treaty and the agreement on an international régime for peaceful nuclear explosions, on which a decision should be taken soon. Through his intervention at our last meeting the representative of the United States, Mr. Foster, raised our hope for progress on this latter issue.

34. A second reason of an imperative character is that the completion of the ban on nuclear testing would be a very important disarmament measure -- and we are looking eagerly for the emergence of the first such measure, which we have been promised in article VI of the non-proliferation treaty. The cessation of the further development and refinement of nuclear weapons -- that is, qualitative nuclear disarmament -- now seems the most timely of the possible nuclear disarmament measures. Since "overkill" capacity has been reached by the main nuclear-weapon Powers, it is the race concerned with changing the quality of the weapon systems which is threatening to upset the precarious balance in which the world is living.

35. Finally, there is another, much more positive and enticing, reason for stretching our efforts to achieve an end to nuclear-weapon testing. Nothing could provide a poverty-stricken and problem-ridden world with a greater vision of hope than the release of the many thousands of scientists and technicians whose superior ingenuity is now exploited in this barren sector of advancing destruction capabilities. It has been said many times that the research and development phases of advanced weapon construction are the ones which tax particularly hard these crucial resources for innovation and problem-solving. The production and deployment phases are much more routine in character. That is why this ban on scientifically-advanced weapon development could be such a valuable factor for the world economy as a whole.

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36. I submit that our respect for the human mind and our duties towards our fellow beings compel us to seek an early end to the waste we now permit and to the risks in regard to security which, at the same time, we incur.

37. Mr. CARACCILOLO (Italy) (translation from French): I have the honour to inform this Committee that, after a recent debate on foreign policy, the new Italian Parliament approved the decision taken by the Government to associate itself with the United Nations resolution on the non-proliferation treaty (ENDC/226*), and expressed itself in favour of signing that treaty. That debate and the vote at its conclusion have particular importance and significance. They show that, despite the diversity of opinions expressed by the democratically-elected representatives, it is indeed the Italian nation as a whole which is approving the non-proliferation treaty, to the achievement of which my delegation was happy to make its contribution both in Geneva and in New York.

38. Both the statements made by the many speakers who took part in the debate and the motions adopted by the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies stressed the great importance of the non-proliferation treaty and the role of a dynamic, even decisive, factor which it can play in enabling us to achieve the fundamental objectives of disarmament and peace. At the same time the Italian Parliament asked the Government to make every effort to ensure that in the implementation of the treaty the commitments undertaken by the nuclear Powers should be followed by concrete measures of application to nuclear disarmament and that, side by side with these, other effective measures should be taken to ensure respect for the interests and rights of the non-nuclear States with regard to the supply of source and special fissionable material, the exchange of technical and scientific information, and equality of participation in the control and development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in a spirit of complete co-operation.

39. There is another point to which the Italian Parliament particularly drew the attention of my Government: that in the implementation of the treaty any measure likely to compromise the creation of a united Europe, to which the peoples of the Continent aspire, should be avoided. In this respect also the Italian Parliament strongly urged the Government to spare no effort for the conclusion of a satisfactory

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agreement between the International Atomic Energy Agency and EURATOM on the application of article III of the non-proliferation treaty, which deals with controls, so as to preserve intact the function and activity of the European Atomic Energy Community.

40. We hope that our Committee will now be able to concentrate on the tasks which all the countries represented here, and in particular the nuclear Powers, have undertaken to bring to a satisfactory conclusion. I see as a first encouraging sign that without losing precious time, and leaving aside the conventional trite statements and clichés which are not infrequently used during opening meetings, the nuclear Powers have from the very first meeting gone straight to the heart of the matter in important statements.

41. In our view it is comforting to observe that, just when we have opened a new phase of our negotiations, the responsible authorities of the two great nuclear Powers have recognized by their stand the urgent, and even imperative, necessity of following up the conclusion of the non-proliferation treaty with other agreements aimed at reversing a dangerous situation. This undertaking, given to the world by the two Powers almost simultaneously, is indeed all the more significant because the only measures which can set off the renunciation requested by the non-nuclear Powers in the matter of nuclear armaments must be sought in the reduction of vertical proliferation, both qualitative and quantitative.

42. In this respect the Soviet delegation made the following very clear statement on 16 July:

"It is necessary to bend every effort in order to make further progress towards slowing down the arms race and towards disarmament in order to achieve the conclusion of further international agreements in this field." (ENDC/PV.381. para. 17).

For his part, President Johnson in his message to our Committee (ENDC/228) made a solemn appeal to us by reminding us of the great responsibility of the Powers meeting in Geneva, and by specifying that for its part the United States of America is fully conscious of that responsibility.

43. But the stands taken by the United States and the Soviet Union are not limited to expressions of good will; they contain also common ideas from which we can single out useful elements for our future negotiations. We find first of all the same will

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to begin direct conversations with a view to reaching agreement on the limitation of strategic-weapon delivery systems. Even if these negotiations can take place only through bilateral contacts, we fully share the view expressed by other delegations that the Eighteen-Nation Committee should at any rate be kept informed of their progress.

44. The indications given by the two great Powers also give us valuable guidance towards the drafting of a concrete and reasonable agenda. To achieve this goal we should indeed seek the items which are most likely to obtain the agreement of the Powers which, under the non-proliferation treaty, are called upon to undertake the greatest commitments. It is also necessary to take into account world public opinion, which wishes to see tangible measures, inspired by wisdom and commonsense and aimed at reducing world tension and strengthening general security. This choice entails the firm determination not to be tempted by illusory, unrealistic or premature proposals.

45. The Italian delegation considers that, among the various tasks entrusted to the Committee by the General Assembly at different periods, the most important and the most urgent is to start negotiations on the disarmament measures mentioned in article VI of the non-proliferation treaty, in conformity with the operative paragraphs of resolution 2373 (XXII) (ENDC/226*). The consideration of some of those measures should be undertaken without delay because they seem to us to offer possibilities for tangible progress.

46. First I should like to emphasize the measure concerning the extension to underground nuclear tests of the 1963 Moscow Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1) on the prohibition of nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. That measure, to which the treaty devotes a whole paragraph of its preamble, has thus acquired special significance and priority. We are happy to observe that the three delegations of the nuclear Powers have taken a stand in favour of considering that problem, and that other delegations accord it high priority. More particularly, we think that the Committee should give its full attention to the ideas suggested by the representative of the United Kingdom to overcome the difficulties which have so far prevented the conclusion of an agreement. Among the suggestions made by his delegation we have particularly appreciated the desire to tackle one of the concrete aspects of the problem by proposing a compromise solution of the all-important question of on-site verification (ENDC/PV.381, para. 76).

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47. However, we cannot refer to the problem of the cessation of all nuclear tests without mentioning another problem linked to it by a structural rather than a functional affinity -- that is the problem of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. The debate on non-proliferation had the great merit, among others, of highlighting the importance of that aspect of the use of nuclear energy. Therefore we are not only convinced of the necessity of studying the future implications of that aspect but are also bound by the precise provisions of the non-proliferation treaty. Now we must ascertain when, where and how this question should be examined.

48. The representative of the United Kingdom proposed that we take a first step towards putting into operation the process of implementing article V of the non-proliferation treaty. He suggested that the Committee should immediately examine the possibility of writing a letter to the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency requesting it to express its views on the role which the Vienna Agency might be called upon to play (*ibid.*, para. 81). Without wishing, for the time being, to go into all the possible implications of that proposal, I should like to say that it seems to us to be somewhat premature at the present stage.

49. The measures for implementing article V of the non-proliferation treaty -- which should not be considered as disarmament measures -- are really part of the problem of nuclear activities for peaceful purposes, which is already on the agenda of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States. On the other hand, it is impossible to maintain that our agenda does not contain other priority items: indeed, under General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII), paragraph 4, we must give priority to the implementation of article VI of the treaty. It seems to me, therefore, that there would be no harm in waiting a month or two until the end of the forthcoming discussion at the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States -- which will attach particular importance to the problems raised by article V -- before we take up this subject again. The wording of our agenda and a premature choice must not convey the impression that we wish to anticipate the work of the forthcoming Conference.

50. A second measure which could usefully be considered is to reduce the production of fissile material for military purposes. It seems to us that it is high time to

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envisage an agreement which would be the first step towards ending the manufacture of nuclear weapons. For a long time the "cut-off" has been included in the list of measures recommended by the United States. The Soviet memorandum also mentions, under item 2, measures for stopping the manufacture of nuclear weapons and for reducing and destroying stockpiles (ENDC/227). Hence none of the pre-conditions raised in the past should any longer be an obstacle to a first examination of this substantive problem. To undertake that task would be not only the logical consequence of the non-proliferation treaty but also evidence that our Committee wishes to take fully into account the wishes expressed by a number of countries not members of this Committee.

51. A third question might also, in the view of the Italian delegation, become the subject of fruitful negotiations. That is limitation of armaments on the sea-bed. Here we are obviously on virgin ground, because this measure has not yet been subjected to the sifting process which has always proved necessary for considering the data of each new problem in depth.

52. However, even if we had to begin by exploratory work, positive results could be achieved quite soon. A measure for the limitation of armaments on the sea-bed would not be unprecedented, since a similar agreement has been concluded to prohibit the placing in orbit in outer space of any weapons of mass destruction (General Assembly resolution 2222 (XXI)). Furthermore, it should be noted that the Soviet memorandum and the message of President Johnson both refer to the possibility of an agreement for this purpose.

53. Whatever the importance and urgency of nuclear disarmament measures within the work of our Committee, we should not neglect other questions upon which we could now usefully focus our attention. I should like to mention in this connexion chemical and bacteriological weapons, with regard to which, as suggested by the United Kingdom representative (ENDC/PV.381, paras. 87 et seq.), the Committee could study the problem of revising and bringing up to date the Geneva Protocol of 1925.

54. Like many other delegations, we consider that the new turning-point in world affairs brought about by the conclusion of the non-proliferation treaty should not be missed. During this very year there will be two opportunities for us to extend the usefulness of our work to all the other countries in the world. I refer to the

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Conference of the Non-Nuclear-Weapon States and the twenty-third session of the United Nations General Assembly. I believe that we are all concerned in proving that the results which we are seeking within this Committee are fully in conformity with the objectives of the treaty.

55. The Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, which will open in Geneva on 29 August, will give to the countries which in the General Assembly in New York showed a desire to reflect more deeply on the implications of the non-proliferation treaty the opportunity to express their views more clearly. Furthermore, I see a specific role for all those countries represented in our Committee which will be participating in various capacities in that Conference. That role will be to assist the delegations which have been unable to follow our work closely by providing them with all useful clarifications.

56. Consequently, the drafting of a solidly-built and comprehensive agenda and, even better, the preparation of a broad programme of work are in our view important tasks for our Committee, deserving our fullest attention. That agenda and programme of work should, in our opinion, reflect the serious approach by means of which our Committee is preparing to bring to a successful conclusion in the coming months or years the great and final task entrusted to it -- to clear the way for general and complete disarmament.

57. I hope that the elaboration of such a programme of work will also prove to those Powers which, although they have not so far adhered to the non-proliferation treaty, have recently shown renewed interest in the problem of disarmament that we fully share their desire to achieve "realistic and total" disarmament, and will persuade them that only a progressive method can enable us to approach the problem "realistically", avoiding the pitfalls both of Utopia and of demagogy.

58. Mr. J. ROSZEK (Poland): First of all I should like to express my thanks to those representatives who have been kind enough to extend a welcome to me and whom I have not yet had the opportunity of thanking. In particular my thanks go to Mr. Burns of Canada, Mr. Husain of India, Mr. Christov of Bulgaria and Mr. Lahoda of Czechoslovakia.

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59. I should like now to comment briefly on some of the questions facing the Committee. The Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament has resumed its work in an international situation which seems to be conducive to successful negotiations on further disarmament measures. First, the non-proliferation treaty (ENDC/226^{*}) was successfully concluded a few weeks ago. The Polish People's Republic, like many other States, attaches great importance to the treaty. My country played an active role in its elaboration and in co-sponsoring the draft resolution which became General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII) of 12 June 1968 (*ibid.*). Poland was among the first States to sign the treaty. Following the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty of 1963 (ENDC/100/Rev.1) and the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 (General Assembly resolution 2222 (XXI)), the non-proliferation treaty is the most important link in the chain of measures aimed at the cessation of the nuclear arms race. The treaty has banned all direct and indirect possibilities for the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

60. Moreover, as a result of the joint effort made by the nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States, the international community has been given an important instrument of co-operation, not only in the field of disarmament but also with regard to the peaceful applications of nuclear energy. We can see an important relationship between these two fields. All steps aimed at the gradual reduction and subsequent elimination of nuclear weapons could have, in our opinion, a decisive influence upon the scope and methods of peaceful applications of nuclear energy. The successful combination of the various forms of co-operation among States provided under the treaty offers advantageous premises for further negotiations in the field of disarmament, with regard both to the key disarmament problems and to other collateral and regional measures. There is of course one fundamental condition of further progress in this field, namely that all States must refrain from any action that might frustrate direct or indirect objectives of the treaty.

61. Another welcome development has been the recent announcement of an agreement between the USSR and the United States to enter in the near future into bilateral negotiations concerning a general limitation and reduction of the means of delivery of offensive strategic nuclear weapons and of defensive systems against

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ballistic missiles. Poland, like many other countries, believes that any progress in this field would have a positive influence upon the solution of other important disarmament problems as required under article VI of the non-proliferation treaty, which commits parties --

"... to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control."

62. Finally, a number of interesting proposals have been made concerning the Committee's future work. I have in mind first of all the memorandum of the Soviet Government (ENDC/227), as well as the message addressed to this Committee by President Johnson (ENDC/228), the statement by the representative of the United Kingdom (ENDC/PV.381), and other proposals. These proposals give us varied and at the same time ample possibilities of implementation of the Committee's tasks.

63. I should like to stress in particular the fundamental importance of the proposals contained in the memorandum of the Government of the Soviet Union of 1 July on some urgent measures for stopping the arms race and for disarmament. This memorandum, while stressing the urgent need to adopt measures of nuclear disarmament, enumerates many concrete and realistic disarmament proposals which are in full agreement with the preamble and article VI of the non-proliferation treaty. We fully support those proposals and regard them as an adequate and acceptable basis for further disarmament negotiations.

64. While recognizing these encouraging prospects, the Committee cannot ignore a number of negative factors which adversely affect the possibilities of further speedy progress. The war in Viet-Nam continues. The consequences of the Israeli aggression against the Arab countries have not yet been removed. The nuclear arms race tends to assume new dimensions promoting new ambitions and new fears. The adversaries of the non-proliferation treaty and of the very concept of disarmament have not given up. While the treaty has already been signed by nearly seventy States, the forces which are in opposition to its objectives are undertaking efforts,

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differing in scope and in nature, to delay the putting into effect of the treaty and to undermine these objectives by interpretations that go counter to the letter and the spirit of the treaty.

65. Poland is particularly interested in an early entry into force and in the subsequent implementation of the non-proliferation treaty, both at the universal and at the regional level. That is why Poland, as a European State, cannot remain indifferent to the attitude adopted towards the treaty by the German Federal Republic. Unlike the other German State, the German Democratic Republic, which was among the first States to sign the non-proliferation treaty, the German Federal Republic strives to avoid taking a clear and unequivocal position towards the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. What is more, the Government of the German Federal Republic is trying to turn the non-proliferation treaty into an object of bargaining and pressure in order to extract political concessions. That Government seeks to impose upon other States its own interpretation of the treaty -- an interpretation which, if accepted, would allow the German Federal Republic to maintain its well-known claims in the field of both foreign policy and military planning, in particular its claims to nuclear arms. Such an attitude cannot but constitute an encouragement for all the overt and covert opponents of the non-proliferation treaty.

66. Important international instruments have accorded priority to nuclear disarmament in the disarmament negotiations, thus determining the direction of our future work. I have in mind, in particular, articles VI and VII of the non-proliferation treaty and the preamble to the treaty, as well as paragraph 4 of the operative part of General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII). Taking that into consideration, the Polish delegation fully shares the opinion that the attention of the Committee should be concentrated on various measures relating to nuclear disarmament. The implementation of such measures would reduce and eliminate the threat of nuclear war, strengthen the sense of security in the world, and consequently greatly facilitate the achievement of our ultimate goal -- general and complete disarmament.

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67. Among the many measures of nuclear disarmament we attach particular importance to the problem of the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. The General Assembly of the United Nations has adopted two important resolutions on this matter. In resolution 1653 (XVI) of 1961 the Assembly proclaimed, inter alia, that the use of nuclear weapons is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and constitutes a crime against mankind. In resolution 2289 (XXII) of 1967 (ENDC/210) the Assembly recognized the importance of the examination of the question of the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and of the conclusion of an appropriate international convention. The wide support which those two resolutions received in the General Assembly is but one reflection of the great importance which States attach to the question of the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons as an effective, though preliminary, step towards the elimination of the threat of nuclear war.

68. We have always been of the view that the problem of the cessation of production of nuclear weapons and reduction and elimination of their stockpiles should be high on the list of priorities on our agenda. In its memorandum of 1 July the Government of the USSR declared its readiness to open negotiations on this matter with all other nuclear Powers. The adoption of this proposal in good faith would undoubtedly have a positive effect upon both disarmament negotiations and the international climate.

69. We are convinced that new efforts are required to reach an agreement banning underground nuclear-weapon tests. The Polish delegation shares the opinion that there exist adequate technological conditions for the detection by national means of any possible violation of an underground test ban. This provides a favourable basis for taking a political decision on this matter.

70. We see ample possibilities also for negotiations on other collateral measures proposed to the Committee. One of these is the question of the prohibition of the use of bacteriological and chemical weapons. Our position in this respect was clearly expressed at the twenty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly when we strongly supported the demand (resolution 2162 B (XXI)) for strict and universal observance of the Geneva Protocol of 1925. In our opinion this should be

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a starting-point for any possible further steps in the field of the elimination of chemical and bacteriological weapons. We consider as useful the suggestion that the Secretariat should prepare a report on the effects of the use of bacteriological and chemical weapons. In our view all the arguments advanced previously in support of an earlier report (A/6858) on the effects of the use of nuclear weapons, prepared on the initiative of Poland, remain valid in the case of the suggested report on chemical and bacteriological weapons.

71. Another matter for discussion in the Committee could be the question of the demilitarization of the sea-bed and ocean floor with a view to securing their use exclusively for peaceful purposes.

72. Article VII of the non-proliferation treaty has confirmed the right of States "to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories." In parallel with negotiations on general disarmament problems, article VII gives States considerable possibilities for undertaking and implementing various measures of regional nuclear disarmament. Such measures can contribute to strengthening the regional effectiveness of the non-proliferation treaty.

73. Poland has been traditionally interested in the achievement of such measures in Europe. This keen interest is understandable in the light of the geographical situation and the historical experience of Poland. It stems from the fundamental premises of our foreign policy. We have concentrated our initiatives on a region in which, as a result of the existence of the two military alliances equipped with the most up-to-date and devastating weapons, the consequences of a possible armed conflict would be the most disastrous. It is for that reason that my Government has put forward a number of concrete proposals which, if adopted by all the parties concerned, would certainly contribute to the reduction of the danger of an armed conflict in that sensitive area and to the general improvement of the situation in Europe. I should like now to recall only the plan for the creation of an atom-free zone in Central Europe and the plan for the freezing of nuclear armaments in that region (ENDC/C.1/1). We see in the provisions of the non-proliferation treaty a

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confirmation of the rightness of our diplomatic efforts in this field. We are prepared to continue those efforts with a view to creating conditions conducive to lasting security in Europe.

74. While presenting our preliminary views today we should like to reserve our right to speak in greater detail on the problems which will be considered in the course of the further deliberations in the Committee. We are convinced that the Committee will spare no effort to secure progress in the implementation of its tasks, thus bringing nearer the achievement of its main objective, universal and complete disarmament.

75. The decisive contribution of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to the elaboration of the non-proliferation treaty has aroused among the peoples of the world the hope, which we consider fully justified, that the Committee will play a similarly constructive part in the solution of other disarmament problems. We must do everything possible to turn this hope into reality.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 385th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Alhaji Sule Kolo, representative of Nigeria.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Sweden, Italy and Poland.

"The delegation of Sweden submitted a letter from the representative of Sweden to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations (ENDC/230).

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 1 August 1968, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12 noon.